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Judicial Ethos and the Autonomy of Law
Paul W. Kahn*
Eugene Garver's For the Sake of Argument is a tremendously
interesting book on one of the most important topics in jurisprudence
today.' This topic used to be called the "autonomy of law." Today, the
issue is better put as understanding the rational character of law. If we
can no longer speak of law as a science, what is it that distinguishes the
reasoning of law from other forms of political reasoning? Especially
interesting is the way in which Garver analyzes a situation familiar to
those of us who practice law: the experience, on the presentation of
equally plausible arguments from opposing sides, of equipoise that gives
way to decision, followed by a sense of necessity. The problem is to
understand this movement from legitimacy to justice in a way that does
not undermine the autonomy of law by appealing to interests,
subjectivity, or politics. Garver argues that, during this mysterious
middle moment of decision, logic may give out but reasonable argument
is not exhausted.
Modem jurisprudence began with the simple claim that the
autonomy of law derived from the unity of the source of law: the will of
the sovereign.2 That law was the will of the sovereign seemed clear to
those who focused on the character of its enforcement: the coercive
power of the sovereign will be applied to punish and correct violations.3
But this view was soon supplemented by another: the autonomy of the
law lies not in its origin, but in its content. Legal autonomy points to the
* Robert. W. Winner Professor of Law and the Humanities and Director of the
Orville H. Schell, Jr. Center for International Human Rights, Yale Law School. Thanks
to Adam Romero for excellent research assistance.
1. EUGENE GARVER, FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT: PRACTICAL REASONING,
CHARACTER, AND THE ETHICS OF BELIEF (2004).
2. E.g., JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED AND THE
USES OF THE STUDY OF JURISPRUDENCE (Wilfrid E. Rumble ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1995) (1832).
3. E.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457
(1897).
4. E.g., THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION
(Lawbook Exchange 1998) (1868). Cooley's work in constitutional law is a precursor for
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closed character of a system of legal reasoning. For every legal question,
legal science could produce a single, correct answer. Experts in the field
would agree on the answer because they would reason in an identical
manner from common sources.
These two competing ideas on the sources of the autonomy of the
legal order-sovereign will or rational science-were both subject to
devastating attack by the legal realists who argued that claims for a
deductive science of law are "transcendental nonsense, 5 and that the
unitary sovereign is really nothing more than a competition among
interest groups.
If there is no unity to law, however, what distinguishes law from
politics? For much of the twentieth century, the answer was "nothing."
Law was understood as "politics continued by other means.,' 6 If politics
is an art of compromise, then law was an art of "balancing." 7 Of course,
that does not mean that nothing useful, normative, or true could be said
about politics or about that particular form of politics that is law. A just
politics has as its end the material well-being of its members; it supports
their individual participation in a project of community self-
determination and _protects their personal liberties. 8 Different theories
were elaborated as to the correct measure of politics-utility or justice,
for example-and different views were offered as to how courts could
contribute to these ends.9 Nevertheless, a theory of law had to find itself
in this political world. Some theories made law an adjunct to the
political process ("policing the process of representation"),' ° some an
adjunct to administrative rationality ("legal process")," and some to
utility maximization ("law and economics").' 2  Still others tied law to
the work on the common law of Christopher Langdell and his followers at Harvard Law
School. See GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 42 (1977).
5. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 842 (1935).
6. See generally ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1986).
7. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE
L.J. 943, 948-49 (1987).
8. This idea ofjustice provides the foundation of human rights law.
9. E.g., RONALD M. DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996); Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-
Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV.
7 (1969); Richard Posner, Wealth Maximization and Judicial Decision-Making, 4 INT'L
REV. L. ECON. 131 (1984).
10. E.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW (1980).
11. E.g., HENRY HART & ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey
eds., 1994) (1958).
12. E.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
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ideas of Rawlsian justice 13 or Pocockian republicanism. 
14
By the last quarter of the century, however, many were wondering
what happened to the autonomy of law. Something had gone wrong with
theory, for it did not seem to capture very well the character of our
practice and belief in the rule of law. Those who live a life immersed in
the law believe that they are working within an autonomous domain of
reasoning. They feel that they are constrained by law and working to
establish the truth of the law. They define themselves by distinguishing
their practice from that of politics, believing that their decisions are not
simply an expression of their personal preferences. They understand law
as deeply normative, but it is not the same as morality. They also believe
that law's rule embodies and reflects the character of our polity, but it is
not merely a product of political factions or of a balancing of interests
among those factions.15
As a consequence of this reexamination, there were shifts in the
character of legal scholarship. A new focus on doctrinal work appeared.
Scholars were concerned with canons of interpretation, with textualism
and intratextualism, with precedents rather than with high theory.' 6
Without a good theory of law's autonomy, there is a natural inclination
to act out that autonomy by turning to doctrine narrowly conceived.
Simultaneously with the turn to doctrinal analysis appeared a new
interest in narrative. 17  Understanding the autonomy of law required
theorizing an experience that lies between the domain of formal
rationality, on the one hand, and individual or group preferences, on the
other-that is, between logic and politics. Narrative seems to occupy
just this middle range. Narrative does not reject the demands of formal
reason, but it recognizes that logic alone will not get us very far. Neither
is narrative simply an expression of personal interest. Community and
ANALYSIS (1970).
13. E.g., DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986).
14. E.g., Cass Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1651 (1988);
Cass Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985).
15. See generally PAUL W. KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW: RECONSTRUCTING
LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP (1999); PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA (1997).
16. E.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Intratexualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999); Akhil
Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term-Forward: The Document and the Doctrine,
114 HARV. L. REv. 26 (2000); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory
of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987); Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
The Supreme Court, 1996 Term-Forward: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 54 (1997); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175 (1989).
17. E.g., PETER BROOKS & PAUL GEWIRTZ, LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND
RHETORIC IN THE LAW (1996); Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-
Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
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narrative are always mutually constitutive. A community's narrative
offers the common ground that supports the possibility of disagreement
within a single, on-going project. If law is constitutive of community,
then it must be embedded in narrative. As Robert Cover said, there is no
nomos without narrative.18 That narrative is built out of and supports
what Garver calls "common knowledge": a common history, a common
set of commitments and paradigms from which and by which we
reason. 19
The idea of narrative generated three different approaches. First,
there were those who took literally the idea of story-telling, trying to add
their stories to the corpus of American legal rhetoric.2 ° Second, there
were those who tried to elaborate, from within the law, the public values
sustained in this communal narrative.2 1 Third, there were those who tried
to theorize law's need for narrative.22 This form of legal theory had to
look less like philosophy and more like cultural anthropology. At issue
was the interpretation of a practice. Theory had to stick close to facts,
shunning too much abstraction toward justice or efficiency.
The most important figure in this third category was Ronald
Dworkin.2 3 Despite its Aristotelian frame, Garver's jurisprudential
project sits very close to that of Dworkin. Much of what Garver has to
say about authority, for example, reminded me of Dworkin's metaphor of
the "chain novel": it is a matter of reasoning with, rather than
complying. 24 For both, integrity is central to decision-making. Dworkin
too uses the idea of integrity to describe this middle domain as one in
which character is as important as logic. 25 He agrees with Garver that
the character that matters to law is principled, not interested; it is built
within the legal arguments offered, rather than brought to the
controversy. Both understand that integrity is demonstrated by the
18. Cover, supra note 17, at 5.
19. See GARVER, supra note 1, at 37-43.
20. E.g., PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A
LAW PROFESSOR (1991); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ROOSTER'S EGG: ON THE
PERSISTENCE OF PREJUDICE (1995).
21. E.g., CAROL J. GREENHOUSE ET AL., LAW AND COMMUNITY IN THREE AMERICAN
TOWNS (1994); Cover, supra note 17; Austin Sarat, Narrative Strategy and Death
Penalty Advocacy, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 353 (1996).
22. E.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
23. See, e.g., id.; DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 9.
24. Compare DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 22, at 225-38 (comparing the
task of the judge to that of an author attempting to contribute a chapter to a chain novel)
and DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW, supra note 9, at 10 (arguing that authority is drawn from
the interpretation of past acts of popular will as expressions of consent to rule under
moral principles) with GARVER, supra note 1, at 109-131 (arguing the Court creates
authority through argument premised on and constituted by symbols, ethics, and
authorities shared among the community).
25. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 22, at 164-67.
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construction of an ethos and that legal argument is central to this project.
If we ask what makes ethos so important to legal argument, I think
the answer has much to do with what we might call the circumstances of
adjudication or of legality more broadly. Legal argument takes place in a
situation that simultaneously offers too little and too much. To fully
pursue the normative issues at stake in any constitutional case of
moderate complexity would be the effort of a lifetime. Consider, for
example, the moral philosophy surrounding the issues of abortion or gay
rights, or the issues generated by the tension between equality and
liberty, or of free speech and silencing. The Court confronts these issues
under the relentless pressure of the docket. Justices cannot argue to a
conclusion: they vote, they compromise, they do their best to articulate a
position that can hold together diverse views, and then they move on to
the next case. Bickel famously praised the Justices for exercising the
26virtues of the academic, but the actual Justices are far too busy to
meaningfully exercise these virtues. Their work is not moral
philosophy-not by a long shot. If we are to trust them, it must be
because we trust the character they bring to bear on these issues. We
understand that character, however, not because we have access to them
personally, but because we see the reasons they offer to justify what they
have done.
Just as circumstances constrain, resources overwhelm. There are
always an indefinite number of ways to reach a conclusion or to reach a
contrary conclusion. There are no "givens" in the law, no necessary
starting points. Who would have thought that we could reach a
conclusion about racial equality by starting from the Commerce
Clause?27 Reasoning is analogical, which means that the movement from
one point to another is unpredictable in advance. It only becomes clear
once the analogy or distinction is drawn. 28 Logic is not going to tell us
how to build a convincing argument when neither the premises nor the
forms of reasoning are determined in advance. The judicial opinion is
necessarily a performance and an improv performance at that. Again, we
learn whether the Justice has integrity by asking whether he has managed
to take us in by this act of legal bricolage. We want, however, not just to
be enthralled, but also to be enthralled for the right reasons. In the end,
we ask of the Court whether it has made us better; has it treated us as the
26. BICKEL, supra note 6, at 25-26.
27. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964) (ruling federal
prohibition of racial discrimination in restaurants within Congress's Commerce Clause
power); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 286 (1964) (public
accommodations).
28. EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1-4 (1949); see also
KAHN, THE CULTURAL STUDY OF LAW, supra note 15, at 71-72.
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kind of people we believe we should be? A successful judicial opinion,
for this reason, cannot be other than principled.
Both Garver and Dworkin see that what is at stake in such an
argumentative context is character, and the virtue that we seek is
"integrity." Thus, Dworkin gives us the memorable figure of Hercules,
who reflects the whole of the legal order in the integrated character of his
own commitment to principles. 29 For both Garver and Dworkin, legal
autonomy is a matter of ethos. Ethos is not adequately captured in either
the idea of reason or that of will. It lies in character, which is always a
matter of principles embedded in the will.
If Dworkin's work set us on the trail of integrity twenty years ago,
then Garver reminds us that if our object is to understand the role of
character in argument, we might do well to return to our first and best
source on this topic: Aristotle's Rhetoric. I fear that this is a strategy
that might fall on deaf ears in much of the legal community. Regardless,
because the virtue of integrity-its simultaneous relationship to character
and to argument-was never adequately worked out by Dworkin, we can
use all the help we can get.
Still, there is a common criticism of Dworkin that I fear may apply
with equal force to Garver's work. That criticism of Dworkin is that he
knows only four cases. With Garver's book, I sometimes worried that he
seemed to know only one. Of course, if you are going to pick one case,
an excellent choice is certainly Brown v. Board of Education.
30
Nonetheless, I fear Garver asks this case to bear more weight than it can.
Brown is a great case, but a terrible opinion. If this opinion is a display
of judicial integrity, something seems to have gone wrong.
Brown works through a kind of bait and switch strategy. It purports
to decide only a single issue: the constitutionality of the application of
the separate but equal doctrine to the nation's public schools. It relies
upon a claim about the conditions of democratic self-government-
citizens cannot fully participate in the political or civic life of the modem
nation without an adequate education-and the findings of contemporary
social science-segregation is detrimental to the education of minority
students. Brown concludes that it is both irrational as a matter of public
policy and damaging to individuals to continue to segregate the public
schools.3'
That something more may have been afoot was suggested in
Brown's companion case, Bolling v. Sharpe.32 In Bolling, the Court
29. See DwoRKIN, LAW's EMPIRE, supra note 22, at 380.
30. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
31. Id.at493-95.
32. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
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confronted the problem of an absence of constitutional text putting a
similar obligation of equality upon the federal government. The critical
line of that opinion-a line that Garver does not emphasize, although it
seems to support his reading-is that in which the Court pronounces it
"unthinkable" that the federal government could continue to discriminate
when and where the states could not.33 Of course, from a historical,
structural, and textual point of view it is not unthinkable at all. Two
generations later, the Court briefly allowed the federal government to
discriminate in the context of affirmative action while prohibiting the
states from doing so.34  However, if the basis of Brown is a moral
principle of equality, rather than education policy or social science, then
indeed it is "unthinkable." That principle, not policy, is at issue became
clearer in the years following the Bolling decision as the Court struck
down every application of the "separate but equal doctrine. 35
For Garver, this is a demonstration of argumentative ethos; of the
Court taking responsibility for a decision by showing itself to be of a
certain character, building trust in that character through the arguments it
offers (and fails to offer), and moving beyond what the more formal tools
of reason alone could have offered. I cannot quite see it this way.
Indeed, if Garver's general view of the need for ethos is correct, the
inadequacy of Brown may tell us something important about the ultimate
collapse of the Second Reconstruction Movement.
Garver suggests that Chief Justice Warren was right in turning to
the tools of politics in place of the traditional tools of law. The Court
made a tough decision and then spent ten years exercising tactical
judgments about how far to push-putting off miscegenation laws until
the end-and how much to demand-allowing resistance and delays at
the remedy stage. While it may have been exercising tactical political
judgments over this period, it was not saying very much. For the most
part, the Court offered no reason beyond a mute citation to Brown itself.
As Justice Scalia has warned, however, those that live by the ipse dixit,
33. Id..at 500 ("In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the states from
maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be unthinkable that the same
Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.").
34. Compare Metro Broad. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 563-66 (1990) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to federal affirmative action programs) and City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 487-91 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to state and local
affirmative action plans but suggesting that federal plans might be evaluated more
leniently) with Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (applying strict
scrutiny to federal affirmative action plans and overruling Metro Broadcasting).
35. See New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958)
(per curiam) (invalidating segregation in municipal parks and golf course); Gayle v.
Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (per curiam) (city buses); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879
(1955) (per curiam) (municipal golf course); Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City v.
Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam) (public bathhouses and beaches).
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die by it.36 We can disagree with the principle, but disagreement does
not necessarily detract from institutional respect-as Roosevelt later
learned. Roe v. Wade is immensely controversial and has plenty of its
own problems, but at least there is the clear articulation of a principle:
constitutional liberty includes the right to choose whether or not to have
an abortion.37 Having spoken a constitutional truth into existence, the
principle proves to be remarkably enduring, even in the face of political
opposition.38
This failure to set forth the principle at the heart of Brown has
plagued the Court and the nation for more than a generation. Is it the
anti-discrimination principle or the anti-subordination principle that
stands behind the cases? 39 Is the end color blindness or the elimination
of caste? Knowing which principle was at issue would have made a
huge difference to the definition of the moral core of the nation and thus
to understanding which policies were constitutionally suspect. Without
this clarity, it became possible for the Court to engage in substantial
dissembling when it began the long process of retreat from a
commitment to equality in the 1970's.
When the Court finally made clear a principle, in Washington v.
Davis, it did so without much attention, as if this were just a side issue to
an evidentiary debate.40  But institutions have integrity when they
convince us they are focused on the right issues, when they demand that
we look where they look and provide us a moral compass we feel we can
trust. The silence of the Court both in Brown and afterward was no act
of political friendship. It did not create a community; it set the
conditions for fracture. It invited a legal process of tactical advance and
feint and obscured a clear vision of the problem of race in America. The
Court has managed to take us full circle. Today, we have schools that
give every appearance of segregation by race, and that produce students
who are substantially unequal in their abilities to realize those virtues of
citizenship so praised in Brown. Yet, these "unequal" schools present no
36. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 726 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Ipse dixit is
latin for "he himself said it" and is something asserted but not proven. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 833 (7th ed. 1999).
37. 410U.S. 113(1973).
38. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992) (reaffirming
Roe's essential holding that the Constitution protects a woman's right to choose to abort)
("[T]o overrule under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to reexamine a
watershed decision would subvert the Court's legitimacy beyond any serious question.").
39. Compare, e.g., OWEN M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, in
EQUALITY AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT 84 (1976) with Paul Brest, The Supreme
Court, 1975-Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L.
REv. 1, 2, 48-49 (1976).
40. 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (requiring discriminatory purpose in addition to
discriminatory impact for an equal protection violation).
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problem of constitutional inequality. Indeed, under our "color-blind"
Constitution, these inequalities are legally noncognizable: they have
become invisible.
Garver offers the right principle to judge this situation, although he
does not apply it to the Court itself: we cannot trust an institution that
does not trust itself. The Court's failure to pursue the Second
Reconstruction began with a failure of trust in itself. That failure is
already evident in Brown II,4 1 to which I think Garver gives too little
attention. For here, just one year after the victory of Brown, the Court
takes most of it back: remedial difficulties displaced the principle.
Garver is correct to see that we cannot speak about law in the
abstract. The rule of law is like the domain of the aesthetic: it exists
only insofar as it is embodied in particular artifacts. This is why his
appeal to rhetoric is so attractive: to understand rhetoric, we must stick
close to actual rhetorical performances. This same need to see law as an
embedded practice and not just ideas-i.e., not just talk-requires that
we look at remedies as well as rights. Brown II showed the Court to be
acting as a tactically astute politician. This, however, is a confusion of
roles that works against a judicial ethos of integrity. After three years of
processing Brown, the Court actually ordered nothing; it took no
responsibility for any ameliorative action. It sent the cases back to the
lower courts, knowing full well that this would probably result in the
denial of any relief to the particular plaintiffs. It made up a story of
equitable difficulties, as if the public interest and the private interests of
the plaintiffs ran in opposite directions in these cases. It set no
timetables or deadlines, invoking instead "all deliberate speed." If this
did not invite resistance, it at least made resistance cognizable at the
remedial phase.42
There were examples of judicial heroism in the school
desegregation cases-the ethos of commitment to principle-but not in
the Supreme Court.4 3 It did not have to be this way. Again, compare
Roe, where the Court laid out a detailed remedial scheme that gave
material reality to the right to choose. 4  Of course, the Court was
attacked viciously for drawing up a "regulatory plan"-a legislative
responsibility-but if ethos involves responsibility, then the Court must
not only articulate rights but also ensure their realization. When Casey is
criticized today for undermining Roe, it is because the Court's decision
41. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
42. See Paul Gewirtz, Remedy and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 609-613 (1983).
43. See, e.g., JACK BASS, UNLIKELY HEROES: THE DRAMATIC STORY OF THE
SOUTHERN JUDGES OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT WHO TRANSLATED THE SUPREME COURT'S
BROWN DECISION INTO A REVOLUTION FOR EQUALITY (1981).
44. Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-64.
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threatens the realization of the right it purports to uphold.45
In both of these ways-articulating the principle and taking
responsibility for the practice-there is much to be criticized in the
Court's performance in Brown. The ethos of Brown is too political and
insufficiently legal. Politics is not necessarily less principled than law. I
am hardly accusing the Court of bad faith or of a failure of moral vision.
Rather, there was a failure in its legal ethos. This may have been
because the Court thought that the problem of race in America was
beyond the capacities of law to remedy. That may even have been a
correct judgment. One can't really know about such things. As Garver
reminds us in his book, the measure of the excellence of a rhetorical
performance is not whether in fact it does persuade.
If we address directly this contrast between a political and a legal
ethos, I think we have reason to question another point in Garver's
elaboration of the litigation surrounding Brown. He finds it an
illustrative, rhetorical failure for the District of Columbia's counsel to
have relied upon Justice Taney's eloquent language in Dred Scott v.
Sanford46 to support its argument that the Court is bound to the
Founders' intent and is not free to amend the Constitution to accord with
contemporary values.47 I think this incident more complex than a
rhetorical gaffe. What it suggests to me is that the judicial ethos does not
map out in any simple way on to moral principle-even as compelling a
moral principle as that of racial equality.
I suspect that the attorney was not appealing to the racial prejudice
of the Justices or of the Founders. Rather, he was appealing to an ideal
of judicial courage, i.e., to an ethos of judicial integrity. An important
part of the judicial ethos involves the disappearance-the literal
suppression-of the individual Justice as a subject.48 The rule of law is
not the rule of men, including the Justices on the Supreme Court.
Integrity is a function of the opinion, which is the possession of the
Court, not the individuals. One aspect of the judicial ethos is to rule
against one's own interests, values, and beliefs. Holmes famously
recognized this in his Lochner dissent,4 9 as did the plurality in Casey.5°
45. E.g., Robin L. West, The Nature of a Right to an Abortion: A Response to
Professor Brownstein 's Analysis of Casey, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 961 (1994).
46. 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
47. GARVER, supra note 1, at 112-18.
48. See KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW, supra note 15, at 234-37.
49. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J. dissenting) ("I
strongly believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a
majority to embody their opinions in law.").
50. Casey, 505 U.S. at 867-68 ("An extra price will be paid by those who themselves
disapprove of the decision's results when viewed outside of constitutional terms, but who
nevertheless struggle to accept it, because they respect the rule of law.").
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The appeal to Dred Scott offers a reminder of the demand for judicial
integrity. Counsel tells the Court that other Justices have found
themselves in very difficult situations with respect to the moral claims of
black people in America. They stuck to the Constitution, leaving to the
political process-ultimately the Civil War-the process of
constitutional amendment. To bear the burden of the sin of Dred Scott is
a powerful image of the judicial ethos of integrity. This is just what the
conservative members of the Court say they are doing with respect to the
sin of Roe.
The point of returning to this example of lawyering-of sticking
close to legal artifacts in offering an interpretation-is to emphasize that
the ethos of law is not the ethos of morality. The ethical authority of the
judge does not necessarily arise from doing the right thing. Or more
accurately, because we live simultaneously in different normative
orders-including, the legal, the political, and the moral-there is never
just one right thing to be done. Whether advancing the integrity of the
judge will give us a morally better society is not a question that can be
answered in the abstract. It depends what the courts do with their
integrity.
We should not fetishize law, legal process, or judges. The virtues of
law will not do our moral or political work for us. Brown got this part
right. Its problem was not that it failed morally. Rather, the Court failed
to utilize the possibilities of law to support its moral vision. The Court
thought that its intervention was political and, in the end, paid a political
price.
Often the complaint is made of Dworkin that he does not adequately
distinguish law from morality. With Garver's book I had a similar worry
from the other side: has he adequately distinguished legal from political
ethos? I suspect there is a larger lesson here. The insistence on the role
of integrity in law does link law to both morality and politics.
Approaching the autonomy of law through the conceptions of integrity
and ethos is necessary to understanding the character of reason in law.
The difficulty is to keep sight of the autonomy of law even while law's
reason seems always to be drawing on both morality and politics.
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